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TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Every personal injury affects in some measure both the mind and
the body. The legal compensability of the mental aspect of such in-
jury was, for centuries, so limited as to be practically nonexistent. An
emerging body of modem medical and scientific theory respecting the
nature and degree of mental harm has been reflected in recent tenden-
cies to re-examine the traditional legal attitude.'
Insofar as mental injury disables the victim of tort to an extent no
greater than a coinciding physical injury, no substantial problem of
compensation is likely to arise. The legal approach to such cases is
simply to merge the mental injury, most commonly under the label of
pain and suffering, in the physical, permitting the latter to control the
value of the case. Mental injury may, however, be substantially more
disabling, or it may persist far longer than the physical injury. Or,
there may be evidence of mental harm where no physical injury in fact
resulted from the tort. In these instances, the mental harm may be con-
sidered to be excessive, or unrelated to the physical injury. Whenever
disproportionate mental harm is encountered as one of the consequences
of a tortious act, traumatic neurosis may constitute an element of the
injury.
It is the purpose of this article to indicate the present state of medi-
cal and scientific progress in the field of traumatic neurosis. It will be
the further purpose to summarize the present legal status of mental
harm as a basis of civil liability in general and to consider the rationale
underlying liability and compensation for mental harm, particularly
with respect to traumatic neurosis.
II. MEDICAL BACKGROUND 2
A. In General:
The term, physical aspect of the personality, has reference to the
tangible body tissues, such as the blood, bones, nerves, muscles and
their functions. The mental aspect, or the mind, encompasses the con-
scious and unconscious functioning of the nervous system. The con-
scious processes of the mind are concerned with such functions of the
brain as thinking, association, memory and speech. The unconscious
processes include the emotions such as love, hate, rage and fear.3
I Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497(1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Harper and McNeely, A Re-examination of
the Basis of Liability for Emotional Disturbance, 38 Wis. L. Rxv. 426.2 The following texts have been used as authority for the medical background
of traumatic neurosis: STRECKER, PRACrICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (7th ed.
1951) and NoYEs, MODMEl CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (4th ed. 1953).
3 For a more detailed description of the anatomy of the nervous system with
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The term, pathology, denotes any abnormality of structure or func-
tion of body or mind. A pathological condition may result from disease
or injury. In some instances, the cause may not be susceptible of ob-
jective observation, in others it may be unknown.
One must beware, however, of thinking of the physical and mental
aspects of the personality in terms of a dichotomy of body (soma)
and mind (psyche). The essential unity of the person, traditionally,
has been accepted in the philosophical thought of medicine. Psychiatry
has long maintained ". . . that man was a total and indivisible unity, and,
therefore, in health and disease, every somatic process at once reverber-
ated in all of the man and notably in his emotions; conversely, that every
emotional reaction, whether it was violent and pathologic, like rage, or
merely feeling tone, like a mild state of satisfaction, immediately had
repercussions in every tissue and cell of the body." 4
Recent studies of the physiological (functional) changes incident to
psychological (mental) disturbances have re-emphasized this unity.
These studies, known as "psycho-somatic" research, have demonstrated
the interaction of mental and physical processes, and the interdepend-
ence of function and structure of the organism.5
B. The Neuroses:
The neuroses are pathological conditions primarily affecting the
mind. They are generally considered to be relatively mild disorders of
mental functions. A neurosis may be distinguished from other dis-
orders affecting the mind, as for example a psychosis, in that the neu-
rotic individual remains oriented as to his environment while the victim
of a psychosis may lose touch with reality. The neurotic is concerned
with himself and with his symptoms. Usually this disorder is only
temporarily disabling. In its overt or acute phase it may, however,
seriously interfere with daily life and occupation. A neurosis is not
considered to be an intermediate or transitional stage leading to the
outbreak of the generally more serious disorders such as psychopathic
personality disorders or psychoses.
1. Medical Causation of the Neuroses:
The most recent official classification of mental disorders adopted
by the American Psychiatric Association lists the neuroses or psycho-
neuroses (the latter term is preferred as emphasizing the mental char-
acter of the disturbance) as one of the "disorders of psychogenic origin
or without clearly defined tangible cause or structural change in the
reference to psychosomatic disturbance see Wasmuth, Psychosomatic Disease
and the Law, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 34, 36 (1958).
4 Strecker, op. cit. supra note 2, at 430.
5 See Wasmuth, Medical Evahlation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REv. 7 (1957) and Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psycho-
neurosis, and Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 428 (1957).
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brain."'6 Psychogenic origin simply means that the cause lies in the
mental life.
A complex mechanism is believed to be involved in this causation
which requires a more detailed explanation in order that the relation-
ship of the neuroses to trauma may be appreciated. One widely ac-
cepted view as to the operation of this mechanism is that originally
formulated and described by Freud, and illustrated by his classic case
reports.7 Freud believed that man's behavior is motivated by uncon-
scious urges seeking gratification, as well as by conscious thoughts.
The so-called normal or well-adjusted individual adapts to the experi-
ences of life, to environmental exigencies, by a repression, a losing in
the unconscious, of these instinctive urges which would result in socially
unacceptable behavior. In the neurotic, the process of this adaptation
is faulty. Although the neurotic achieves the same result as does the
normal individual, the repression is not successful. This results in fear,
either that the instinctive gratification may not be found, or that, in
finding it, personal danger or discomfiture may result.
It must be understood that there is no conscious awareness of this
fear, of the emotional conflict which produces it, or of the mechanism
of the adaptation as a whole. This fear is expressed in what the
psychologist calls the "affect"" of anxiety. The term, "affect," may be
defined as the degree and capacity of emotional reaction in response to
stimulation. It is a characteristic of the particular makeup or consti-
tution of each individual. In the well-adjusted person, the fear and
anxiety, if occurring at all, are dissipated by constructive behavior, a
process known as sublimation. In the neurotic, because of an inherent
constitutional defect, by some thought to be hereditary, by others be-
lieved to be due primarily to experiences and resultant faulty attitudes
occuring during the formative years of early childhood, the defective
repression and resultant fear generate a continuing, pervasive anxiety.
This anxiety is the dynamic source of the neuroses. It is unconsciously
present; and the mind, as a compensating or defensive mechanism,
again without conscious awareness, attempts to overcome the anxiety
by behavior which, in turn, constitutes the characteristic symptomatol-
ogy of the various neuroses. The neurotic does not voluntarily act in
this manner, he does not understand why he acts thus, or that his be-
havior is the price exacted of him for conforming to environmental
and social situations. If the experiences of his daily life make little
demand on his emotional life, if he is not further confronted with
stimuli of fear, or situations fraught with anxiety, the latent neurotic
tendencies ordinarily will not interfere with his usual occupation or
daily life.
6 NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 161, 163.
7 FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION To PSYCHOANALYSIS (1934).
8 STRECKER, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 14 (8th ed. 1957).
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It must be remembered, however, that the constitution of the neu-
rotic is vulnerable; that his sensitivity to the stimulus of fear may be far
greater than that of the so-called normal individual; and that his re-
sponse to such stimulation may be greatly exaggerated. An overt,
disabling neurosis may be precipitated not only by one given, powerful
impulse, but may follow relatively minor occurrances and situations.
This response of the neurotic may be likened to the predisposition to
break a bone, such as may occur in certain diseases. A slight impact,
even a hardly noticed glance, may result in a fracture, even though in
the absence of such predisposing disease, no injury would be sustained
at all.
The neuroses may respond to treatment, usually some form of
psychotherapy predicated on the theory as to their psychogenic origin.
This attempts through analysis to unveil the original circumstances
giving rise to the emotional conflict, to raise this conflict from the un-
conscious to the conscious level of the mind, and thereby to remove the
cause of the fear and anxiety. Or, it is attempted to remove such cause
by assisting the victim through guidance to resolve the basic problem so
disclosed.9 Not every neurosis responds to therapy. Sometimes, the
acute phase subsides without treatment. Neuroses frequently are not
seen by the psychiatrist at all, but are discovered and treated by the
general medical practitioner in the course of consultation for some
physical ailment, especially for such complaints as headaches, sleepless-
ness, indigestion, backaches and tiredness. It has been estimated that as
high as 40 to 50% of the complaints of patients encountered in general
practice may be traced to a neurotic origin.' 0
2. Classification of the Neuroses:
The neuroses commonly are grouped according to specific behavioral
reaction patterns associated with various compensating devices or de-
fense mechanisms. Currently, the following major reactions are classi-
fied: anxiety, dissociative, conversion, phobic, obsessive-compulsive, de-
pression and unclassified groups.:" It is not intended here to give
comprehensive, differential descriptions or detailed clinical histories of
these entities, but rather to identify them briefly by their principle and
distinguishing characteristics, particularly as they may relate to the
subject of traumatic neuroses. It should be noted, that these classified
reactions are not necessarily distinct, clinical entities; that there is a
9 Dr. C. G. Baker, Superintendent and Chief Psychiatrist, Yankton State Hos-
pital, S. Dak., in Traumatic Neuroses, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 88 (1958), suggests
as additional therapy in cases of traumatic neurosis the immediate settlement
of litigation from the financial standpoint. He particularly cautions against
financial pension arrangements since these will "... almost certainly pro-
pose a secondary gain for the indefinite continuation of the symptom." (For
"secondary gain" see infra note 22.) See also Hood v. Texas Indemnity In-
surance, 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948).
10 STRECKER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 436.
21 NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 163.
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merging of symptoms and behavior; and that in some instances a differ-
ential diagnosis may not be possible.
a. Anxiety Reaction :12
No specific compensation device is involved in the causation of the
anxiety reaction. Evidence of anxiety is direct, known as "free-float-
ing,"13 and is shown by nervousness, timidity, general apprehensiveness,
and sometimes depression. This is the chronic worrier, the unreason-
ably timid and frightened person. Accompanying symptoms of various
physiological disturbances are frequently encountered, such as palpita-
tions, raised blood pressure, indigestion and diarrhea. Although these
functional disturbances are objectively determinable, there is no dis-
coverable organic cause underlying their presence. This reaction is
frequently encountered in traumatic neurosis. Its symptoms may be
substantially like those constituting ordinary mental anguish. Anxiety
neurosis is indicated when such symptoms are seemingly dispropor-
tionate to the injury sustained. It is probable that in many instances
such a neurosis may go undetected because it is not distinguished from
ordinary anguish.
b. Conversion Reaction:14
The conversion reaction, or conversion hysteria as it is sometimes
called, also frequently involved in traumatic neurosis, has long been
recognized as an entity. The term, conversion, describes the psycholog-
ical mechanism responsible for the production of the symptoms. It is
believed that the repressed impulse is converted or changed directly
into a functional disturbance. This disturbance usually is objective in
nature, but is without observable pathologic cause. It is thought to rep-
resent the hidden, underlying emotional conflict in symbolic form. The
disturbance here may be sensory, such as anesthesia (loss of feeling), 15
paresthesia (prickling or tingling), blindness,- or deafness; or it may
be motor, such as paralysis, 17 contractions,18 tremors or tics, aphonia
(the inability to articulate speech), mutism (inability to phonate), or
12 A sampling of cases involving the anxiety reaction are the following: (severe
agitative state) Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100,
104 (1955); Sexton v. Key System Transit Lines, 144 Cal. App.2d 719, 301
P.2d 612 (1956); (mixed anxiety and conversion reaction) Reyer v. Pearl
River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So.2d 442 (1953).
13 NoyEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.
14 See Crawfis, Conversion Hysteria-An Explanation for Attorneys, 6 CLFv.-
MAR. L. REv. 31 (1957).
15 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Kifer, 216 F.2d 753 (10th
Cir. 1954).16 Ladner v. Higgins, 71 So.2d 242 (Court of Appeals La. 1954) ; (loss of vision
and of hearing, numbness, heat flashes), Morris v. Garden City, 144 Kas. 790,
62 P.2d 920 (1936).
17 Sundquist v. Madison Ry. Co., 197 Wis. 83. 221 N.W. 392 (1928) ; Davis v.
Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939).
Is Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Industrial Commission, 345 Ill. 349, 178 N.E.2d 187
(1931); Summerskill v. Vermont Power & Mfg. Co., 91 Vt. 251, 99 AtI.
1017 (1917).
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even writer's cramp. There may also occur disorders of memory and
association such as amnesia (loss of memory), 19 usually of a tempo-
rary duration; or aphasia (the inability to speak or understand speech
without loss of nervous control of the muscles involved). 20 The per-
sonality in conversion neurosis appears markedly different from that
encountered in the other neurotic reactions. There is no evidence of
anxiety, and the individual takes a complacent, but not overly concerned
interest in his symptoms; he may even be said to enjoy them on oc-
casion. The predisposing constitution is frequently found to show emo-
tional immaturity. Although these symptoms, such as paralysis or
anesthesia, are clearly observable, it will often be noted that they
vary from those which would have been produced by organic causes
such as physical injury or disease. Thus, the anesthesia may be what is
called a "boot"'" or "glove" anesthesia; that is, it affects what the
victim believes to be a functional unit rather than an actual functional
area of nerve patterns. Nerve reflexes may be intact. This is not to
say that these disturbances are consciously faked or wishfully produced.
On the contrary, their origin remains hidden from the victim as part
of his unconscious mental processes.
Characteristic of the conversion reaction is the fact that it may have
a self-serving aspect called "secondary gain. '22 The observable symp-
toms of physical disability arising from the psychological disorder serve
the purpose of meeting or fulfilling a need or desire, as for example a
craving for attention and sympathy, or the wish to escape from a diffi-
cult or unpleasant situation, or the desire for indemnification or comp-
ensation for some injury sustained, which the neurotic individual would
not admit as bearing any relationship to his disability. The connection
between the neurotic symptoms and such desires may be obvious to
others; it is not consciously realized by the victim. In fact, he would
deny, emphatically and in good faith, that any such relationship might
be possible.
c. Dissociative Reaction:
The dissociative reaction involves disturbances of consciousness,
such as partial or total loss of memory, delirium or even stupor. In this
reaction occur the "dissociative fugues. ' 23 This term describes a con-
dition in which the individual is unconsciously impelled to follow some
undertaking, the significance of which remains hidden to him. It may
involve acts of fantasy such as the assumption of a false name or
identity. Here also is observed the "Ganser syndrome. ' 24 This syn-
19 Amnesia, 1 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 17 (1955).
20 Aphasia, 1 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 12 (1954).
21 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Kifer, 216 F.2d 753 (10th Cir.
1954).
22 NOYES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 464.
23 Noyes, op. cit. supra note 2, at 456.
24 Noyes, op. cit. supra note 2, at 457, 505.
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drome occurs in situations in which the individual is confronted with
a relatively simple problem. In resolving the problem, the person ap-
proximates the answer, not correctly, but with a near miss. For ex-
ample, he may state the number eleven as the sum of five and five.
Seemingly this conveys an impression of irresponsibility. This reac-
tion is also thought to have self-serving aspects. It is infrequently en-
countered in litigation.
d. Phobic Reaction:
The phobic reactions are characterized by intense, unreasonable
fears arising from unrecognized sources, but focusing on immediate
objects or situations. These are the well known phobias, too numerous
to list, with new names being coined every year. A random sampling
would include claustrophobia (the fear of confined places), agoraphobia
(the fear of open places), aelurophobia (the fear of cats), and mono-
phobia (the fear of being alone). The extreme distress provoked by
these fears may be accompanied by physical symptoms such as rapid,
pounding heart beats, nausea and extreme fatigue.
2
-
e. Obsessive-Compulsive Reaction:
The typical behavior encountered in this reaction is characterized
by a compulsive, "ritualistic" repetition of thoughts and acts. This
activity is thought to be a substitution rather than a conversion of the
defectively repressed motivating impulse. The individual may be un-
duly meticulous, insecure and particularly sensitive to emotional con-
flict. An often cited example of this reaction is found in the house-
wife, who compulsively empties ash trays after each speck of ash is
deposited, or who cleans an already immaculate house. This reaction
is sometimes referred to as psychasthenia.
2 6
f. Neurasthenia :2T
Another disorder reaction is that known as neurasthenia. This is
sometimes classified as a "psychophysiological asthenic"2S reaction,
(asthenic meaning debility or want or loss of strength), or it may be
grouped with the neuroses, under the anxiety or conversion reactions
if the symptomatology falls predominantely within these particular pat-
terns. This disorder is characterized by chronic fatigue, occurring es-
pecially when constructive work is attempted, but usually not interfering
with personal desires. There is an exaggerated preoccupation with
physical organs and their functions, which is believed to be a trans-
25 Cf. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §905, comment i (1934): "Thus, unless a recogniz-
able mental disease results, there can be no recovery for a long continued
morbid propensity to fear death from rabies, where there is proof that the
dog which bit the injured person was healthy, nor can there be recovery for
the totally unfounded fear of a woman that an injury has prevented her
from ever being able to have a child."
26 Noy s, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13.22
'Annots., 44 A.L.R. 500 (1926) ; 67 A.L.R. 805 (1930).
28 NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 435-437.
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ference of the unconscious concern with emotional problems. The
symptoms of neurasthenia are often observed in the conversion reac-
tion.
g. Traumatic Neurosis :29
The term, traumatic neurosis, has a more practical application in law
than in medicine. The term is not used to identify a particular be-
havioral reaction pattern. Rather, it is descriptive of the factors directly
responsible for the appearance of the neurotic symptoms, even though
their psychogenic origin lies in emotional conflicts remote from these
immediate causal factors.
A given pathological condition is said to be traumatically caused
when it arises in consequence of the impact of an external force upon
the individual. ° Whenever the impact involves a tangible, physical
force, the legal and lay comprehension of the nature of such a force
and resultant injury is identical with the medical. Where, however, the
impact affects primarily the mind (e.g. the threat of personal harm, or
the mental stress accompanying actual physical impact), it may result
in emotional stress because of the fear and anxiety generated. This
stress may evoke a pathological condition affecting the mind. The exist-
ence of such mental injury, or psychic trauma, is accepted by medicine,
and is finding acceptance by the general public and by the courts. 31
The nature of psychic trauma is thus, in the last analysis, the re-
sponse evoked by the impact on the mind resulting from externally
originating impressions, transmitted to the mind by the sensory appa-
ratus of the body. The immediate harmful effect of such mental impact
has variously been called "nervous shock"' or "emotional distress. '33
Since it is believed that body and mind constitute an "essential unity,"
it follows that all injury to the person results in some harm to the
mind (psychic trauma) even though this may be so fleeting or insignifi-
cant that it will not be noted. Psychic trauma, whether incident to
physical impact or not, may have further pathological mental conse-
quences beyond those of the immediate injury. When there appear
29 Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87 (1943)
presents a comprehensive study of the medical and legal aspects of this
topic. See also Loria, Medicolegal Aspects of Traumatic Neurosis, 35 \lCH.
S.B.J. 38 (1956).
30 Lyng v. Roa, 72 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1954).
3' See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease; Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944) and articles cited supra note 1.
Sloane v. Southern California R. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 (1896);
Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540
(1930) ; Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.
1952); Kaufman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1955), Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 230n., noted in 34 TEXAS L. REv. 484 (1956).
32 Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); and see cases
cited note 31 supra.
33 The RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46, comment f (1948 supp.) defines emotional dis-
tress as including "mental anguish, grief, horror, shame, humiliation, embar-
rassment, mortification, anger, chargrin, disappointment, worry and nausea."
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symptoms of any one of the reactional patterns of the various neuroses
following such an impact, either independently, or as an overlay to any
physical injury that may have been sustained, the neurosis may then
properly be called a traumatic neurosis.
Medically, trauma is not considered the primary cause of such a
neurosis.S4 It is thought that the emotional strain and anxiety pro-
duced by the trauma, or the stress incident to physical injury, or the
disruption involved in the circumstances under which the trauma was
sustained, aggravate the pre-traumatic imbalance of the neurotic indi-
vidual. The vulnerable personality is triggered, precipitating the overtly
manifested, possibly disabling behavioral reaction.3 5 Thus, trauma, al-
though not causing the neurosis, may nevertheless be an efficient cause
of its disabling symptoms.
Several questions arise in the confirmation of a diagnosis of trau-
matic neurosis and in relating the neurosis to a given injury. First, does
the pre-traumatic constitution disclose evidence of a neurosis? While
such evidence is almost essential to establish a finding of traumatic neu-
rosis, it will at the same time establish a pre-traumatic impairment.
Second, what is the nature of the injury, and where is its site? Since
such areas as the head, spine and heart are commonly held in special
regard as vital to existence, injuries to those areas may arouse greater
anxiety and a higher incidence of neuroses. Similarly, where the in-
jury occurred under particularly gruesome or harrowing circumstances,
or where there is a definite, prolonged period of apprehensiveness, the
resultant emotional stress may be a strong indication of the presence of
a neurosis. Third, what anxiety producing factors occurred in the
bridging interval between injury and the onset of the neurotic symp-
toms? Here must be considered the train of events set in motion by the
injury itself. Undue solicitude by the family or by medical attendants
may arouse fears as to the severity of the injury. Concern about the
financial burden resulting from the injury and possible incapacity may
give rise to further anxiety. Thus, it may be observed that neurotic
symptoms in response to these factors may appear as an overlay to the
actual physical harm sustained, or in the absence of such harm, after
the lapse of considerable time from the psychic impact. And, of course,
these neurotic symptoms may well persist after objective findings of
physical harm have disappeared.
h. Compensation Neurosis:
The term, compensation neurosis, like traumatic neurosis, does not
34 STRECKER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 409.
35 "Still again, we may compare the pre-traumatic condition of such a neurotic
to a cracked vase. The unobservant or untrained eye may not notice the
crack, but only that the vase will hold water. It is only when the crack
spreads and the vase will no longer hold water that he is conscious of any
defect." Smith and Solomon, supra note 29, at 110.
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describe a specific behavioral reaction, but is applied to any of the
neuroses when the element of "secondary gain" is believed to be one
of the dynamic sources in the production of the neurotic symptoms.
These will often follow the pattern of the conversion reaction, and may
also involve those of the anxiety, phobic and compulsive neuroses.
In compensation neuroses, the desire for and expectation of in-
demnification for a real or supposed disability underlies the element of
secondary gain and constitutes an important motivating factor in the
operation of the neurotic, psychological mechanism. Nevertheless, it is
believed that this behavior is not consciously motivated, and it should
again be noted that the relationship between desire and the production
of disabling symptoms is not voluntary, nor is its significance realized
by the individual who is the victim of this disorder. To establish the
existence of a compensation neurosis, and thereby to substantiate the
involuntariness of the behavior, it may be necessary to look to the past
history of the individual's personality, for the predisposing neurotic
constitution characterized by nervousness, insecurity, sensitivity, ag-
gressiveness, craving for attention or sympathy, sleeplessness, or such
physical complaints as gastro-intestinal disturbances, headaches and
other vague, unspecific complaints.
It has been observed that the disabling symptoms encountered sub-
sequent to the injury and during the course of pending litigation which
constitute the compensation neurosis do not necessarily disappear on the
termination of the dispute, even though the outcome thereof is favor-
able to the claimant.3 6
The phenomenon of compensation neurosis was recognized and
studied in World Wars I and II, and is of significance today in work-
men's compensation cases as well as in personal injury claims. Ele-
ments of compensation neurosis, that is, symptoms traceable to second-
ary gain factors, may appear independently after an injury has been
sustained. They may also be encountered where a traumatic neurosis
has been diagnosed, in which instance these symptoms constitute an
overlay to the already existing neurotic behavior. To establish such a
differential diagnosis may pose extremely difficult problems to the
clinician. The relationship of a compensation neurosis to the trauma
would seem to be tenuous. The further the anxiety producing factors
responsible for its appearance are removed in time and direct conse-
quence from the injury, the more such factors partake of the nature
of independent, intervening causes. Nevertheless, such neurotic symp-
toms have been considered part of the total neurotic reaction following
trauma.
3 7
31 Smith and Solomon, supra note 29, at 138.
37 "It would be hard to differentiate between a traumatic psychoneurosis and
compensation neurosis in this case." The court concludes that where there
is conclusive evidence that the claimant was disabled, it is not necessary to
[Vol. 41
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In considering the secondary gain aspects of the neuroses, a dis-
tinction between that phenomenon and malingering is pertinent.38 Be-
cause the relationship between the underlying, motivating desire and
the means by which gratification may be sought (i.e. such disability as
will call for compensation) seems so obvious, the conclusion is often
drawn by the layman that the disabling symptoms are willfully pro-
duced and that the claim is fabricated. Again, it must be emphasized
that the behavior of the neurotic is not willfully determined, and that
its motivation is unconscious. The malingerer may be distinguished
from the neurotic by the skilled observer. The conscious faker may alho
be recognized by the common sense of laymen. Malingering is some-
times considered to be a symptom of a mental disorder (constitutional
psychopathy), also of psychogenic origin, but one that does not involve
the mechanisms associated with the neuroses. In malingering, the fabri-
cation of symptoms and of claims is produced with full consciousness
of the simulation and with the realized desire thereby to achieve
compensation.
3. Summary of Medical Background:
Medical science offers law in the concept of traumatic neurosis a
term which indicates the circumstances giving rise to the overt mani-
festation of any one or more of the clinically distinguishable behavioral
reaction patterns constituting the neuroses. Thus, the harm sustained
by the victim of a traumatic neurosis falls within the category of an
identifiable, medically recognized disorder of the mind. It further of-
fers widely accepted theories as to the medical causation of the neu-
roses, their origin in the mental life of the victim. From these theories
it follows that traumatic neurosis occurs because of the heightened
susceptibility, characteristic of an already impaired constitution, and
that the disabling symptoms of traumatic neurosis are therefore but an
aggravation of a previously existing mental disorder.
Significant to legal considerations of the subject of traumatic neuro-
sis is the estimated incidence of the neuroses in the general population.
It would appear that traumatic neurosis is not an instance of esoteric,
highly unusual mental harm, but that a substantial minority of people
show evidence of having a constitution that is predisposed to sustain-
ing a traumatic neurosis under given circumstances.
go into the question of traumatic or compensation psychoneurosis. Reyer v.
Pearl River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So.2d 442 (1953). For an informa-
tive discussion of medical testimony and legal problems posed by compensa-
tion neurosis, see majority and dissenting opinions in Hood v. Texas In-
demnity Insurance, 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948).
36 See Keschner, Simulation of Nervous and Mental Disease, 44 MIcH. L. REv.
715 (1946) and Ahlers, The Subjective Complaint and the Medical Examina-
tion, 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 83 (1958). Recent cases where malingering was in
issue are: Peirz v. Industrial Accident Board, 127 Mont. 316, 264 P.2d 709
(1953) ; Ladner v. Higgins, Inc., 71 So.2d 242 (Court of Appeals, La. 1954);
Landrath v. Allstate Insurance Co., 259 Wis. 248, 48 N.W.2d 485 (1951).
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III. MENTAL HARMN AS A BASIS OF TORT LIABILITY
A. Present Status:
When dealing with traumatic neurosis as an element of damages,
it must first be inquired whether mental harm in general may be
compensable under the facts of the given case. The basic problems
which accounted for the traditional reluctance to accord legal recogni-
tion to mental harm must be met by the courts today in a re-examination
of the question of the compensability of injury to the mind. Es-
sentially, this reluctance arises from the intangible and subjective na-
ture of the harm. Because such harm is not susceptible of objective de-
termination, doubt as to its reality and extent led, in the past, to the
formulation of rules to the effect that mental harm, independently,
could not support a cause of action. The rationale of these rules varied
with the nature of the action in which compensation for mental harm
was sought, as well as with the particular views of the various juris-
dictions. Thus, it has been held that mental harm was speculative, that
its compensation would lead to vexatious and fictitious claims, and that
there was no reliable standard of measurement.3 9 In negligence actions
it was decided that no duty could be owed to any person to refrain from
inflicting mental harm upon him ;4o that such harm could not reasonably
be foreseen; that such harm was not proximately caused ;41 that it was
too remote; or simply, that such harm did not warrant legal redress as a
matter of public policy. 42
Notwithstanding the traditional views, decisions today reveal a trend
toward greater liberality in the compensation of mental harm. Earlier
objections have been overcome in part by the recognition of scientific
advances and by changing social and judicial attitudes. Nevertheless,
the older problems, as well as new questions incident to the application
of medical facts to legal doctrines have not been fully resolved. As yet
there are no clearly defined rules of general applicability governing the
status of mental harm as a basis of tort liability.
1. Intentional Tort:
In the action of assault, a mental state constitutes the gist of the
damages. 43 The impact of the tortious conduct is solely on the mind
and the injury sustained consists of emotional distress. Here, the
transient state of apprehension may be compensable, as are also such
39 "To properly estimate such a cause of damages, the door must be opened to
the realms of philosophy, physiology and psychology." Johnson v. Wells,
Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224 (1870) ; Michelson v. Fischer, 81 Wash. 423, 142 Pac.
1160 (1914).
40 Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
41 Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939) ; Spade v.
Lynn, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
42 Mitchell v. Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 109, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
43 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §21 (1934) : "apprehension of an immediate and harm-
ful or offensive contact."
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damages, as the mental distress flowing from the injury.44 Assault is
the only action in which the interest in freedom from mental dis-
turbance was given early and unanimous recognition. 45 The rationale
is thought to rest on a vestige of the early criminal nature of the action,
the punishment of criminal attempts carrying over in the punitive na-
ture of the damages for this attempted battery, which constitute a
breach of the peace.48 The great majority of the courts permit re-
covery even though no physical injury results.4 7
It is also well established that mental disturbance may be an element
of damages incident to the invasion of an independently recognized
interest, as for example, in false imprisonment, 4 seduction,49 aliena-
tion of affections,50 and assault and battery. 51 Here, mental harm is in
effect "parasitic" to the legally protected interest.52
Precedent supports the imposition of liability for insulting, threaten-
ing or harrassing language or conduct in the so-called carrier cases.
5 3
At first, insults to passengers by the defendant's employees were con-
sidered to be a tort arising out of a breach of the contract of safe car-
riage, or a breach of a special obligation to the public.5 4 Gradually, the
action was held maintainable in other instances where a special relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the defendant could give rise to a privity
of contract or to special obligations between the parties, as between
debtor and creditor, 55 and tenant and landlord. 56 However, a right to
compensation could arise only where the tortious conduct, usually in-
sult or threat (not necessarily to personal safety) resulted in tangible,
physical harm.5 7 In the so-called dead body cases, liability is imposed
for intentional conduct involving mutilation and mishandling of corpses,
-- Burger v. Covert, 75 Wash. 528, 135 Pac. 30 (1913).
45 I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y.B. Lib. Assis. f99, pl. 60 (1348).
46 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §24, comment c (1948 supp.).
47 Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 Pac. 700 (1926) ; PRossER, ToRTs, §11(2d ed. 1955).4 8 Award of $2,000 where "suffering and mental shock has been severe and its
duration uncertain" in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky.
583, 136 S.W.2d 759 (1939).49 Pickle v. Page, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930).
50 Rudd v. Dewey, 121 Iowa 454, 96 N.W. 973 (1903).
51 Deevey v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942).52 Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 244 Pac. 700 (1926).
53 Because of the special obligations of the defendants, carrier cases and tele-
graph cases (see note 75 infra) are vanguard decisions in imposing liability
in intentional tort and in negligence. See Chamberlin v. Chandler, C.C.Mass.
1823, 3 Mason 242, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2, 575.
54 Cole v. Atlanta & W.R.R. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 31 S.E. 107 (1897). See PRossER,
op. cit. supra note 47, §11, at 41.
55 Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 243 N.W. 25 (1932) ; noted
in 46 HARV. L. REv. 164; 29 W.VA. L. REv. 186; 7 DRAKE LAW REV. 53(1958) ; Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 108 (1951).
56 Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App.2d 313, 198 F.2d 696 (1948).
57 Ibid. But cf. Barnett v. Collection Service, 214 Iowa 1303, 243 N.W. 25 (1932)
and Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953). Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d
929 (1951).
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where this causes mental distress.58 Public censure of such conduct
may account for this particular rule. In connection with this general
category of liability for insulting or threatening conduct, it should be
noted that where the conduct is particularly reprehensible and the physi-
cal harm sustained is slight, there has been a tendency to find a tech-
nical tort to support the claim.59
There is a "definite trend" today to consider the intentional causing
of severe emotional distress as a separate tort.60 That is to say, security
of the mind, independently of security of the physical body, is accorded
legal protection. In view of the case law, this statement is too broad un-
less important qualifications are added. The language and conduct must
consist of more than mere insult. It must in fact be reprehensible and
outrageous. The emotional distress must be sufficiently severe to cause
or be evidenced by physical symptoms.61 In the light of these qualifi-
cations, the "new tort" 62 encompasses a logical extension of the princi-
ples of the carrier cases to situations where no special obligations and
relationships exist. In effect, the actor may with impunity insult the
so-called normal person. When, however, he affronts a pregnant
woman, or a person suffering from heart disease or from conversion
hysteria, the risk of possible physical consequences such as miscarriage,
heart failure, or hysterical paralysis resulting from the emotional dis-
tress is shifted to the actor.
2. Negligence:
Traditional principles respecting the legal protection of the inter-
est in freedom from mental disturbance against invasion by negligent
conduct are also in a process of change. The trend is toward greater
protection and a corresponding extension of liability. This trend, how-
ever, has stopped short of recognizing the negligent invasion of mental
security, standing alone, as giving rise to a cause of action.63
58Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1920), 68 L.R.A. 956: Lindh v.
Great Northern R. Co., 99 Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823 (1916), 7 L.R.A., N.S.
1018.
9 Technical trespass to plaintiff's land: Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.A.
1068 (1902), 57 L.R.A. 559; Moleman v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 206
Mo. App. 253, 227 S.W. 264 (1921). Assault: Duty v. General Finance Co.,
154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
60 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §46 (1948 supp.) : "The interest in freedom from emo-
tional distress. One who, without privilege to do so, intentionally causes
severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress,
and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it." See Cantor, supra note 5, for a
discussion of this section of the Restatement.61 State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952); Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954). See also cases
cited note 57 supra.
62 Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A new Tort, 37 MICH. L.
REv. 874 (1939). But cf. Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735,
noted in 27 TEXAS L. REv. 730.
63 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46, Comment to Caveats (1948 supp.) : "There is not
yet a sufficient body of decisions to formulate general rules concerning un-
intentional invasions of this interest."
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Where mental harm is incident to or a consequence of physical in-
jury, the question is not whether liability ensues, but rather to what
extent compensation shall be awarded since a cause of action is estab-
lished by the invasion of bodily security.6 4 The issue becomes the proof
of harm alleged and the value of the claim.
A more complex and unsettled question is presented when the negli-
gent conduct primarily causes mental disturbance, as for example fright,
which is evidenced by or results in physical harm. Until late in the nine-
teenth century, almost all courts, as do a substantial minority today,
denied recovery for mental as well as for consequential physical harm
unless the tortious conduct involved a physical impact upon the per-
son of the claimant.65 Such "contact harm"6 6 supposedly guaranteed
the genuineness of the mental disturbance.6 7 After the mental harm
was established as a fact by the impact, it could then be relied upon to
furnish a step in the direct chain of causation from the tortious con-
duct to the bodily harm.6 The actual physical injury in turn attests to
a severity of the emotional disturbance sufficient to warrant compensa-
tion.
Text writers and cases differ on the question whether the prevailing
majority view requires contact harm in negligence cases.6 9 This is
understandable. From a review of the case law, it appears that the
compensability of mental harm does not turn so much on the stated rule
of a given jurisdiction, but is determined by the interpretation of what
constitutes the necessary injury or impact.70 The concept of contact
harm has undergone significant changes in the last half century. It has
been enlarged to encompass injuries that are "trivial or minor in char-
acter,' '7 1 in the full realization that the harm for which compensation
64".. [M ental suffering consequent upon a physical injury has been a per-
missible element of damages." Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, at
233, 21 A.2d 402, at 404 (1941).
65 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), 34 L.R.A.
781. But see Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931), Annot.,
76 A.L.R. 681 (1932), where the same court permitted recovery for a skull
fracture following fright, but found that the deceased sustained a battery in
the accident. Also see cases cited notes 39, 40, 41 supra.
66 OLEcK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY §177 (1957).
67 "The real basis for the requirement that there shall be a contemporaneous
bodily injury or battery, is that this guarantees the reality of the damage
claimed." Homas v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 4583 62 N.E. 737,
57 L.R.A. 291 (1902); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950).
68 Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950) ; Kingan & Co. v. Ossam, 75
Ind. App. 548, 121 N.E. 289 (1918), Annot., 42 A.L.R. 199 (1926).
69 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §46, Comment to Caveats (1948 supp.) note 63
supra; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 47, §37, at 179; OLEcIc, op. cit. supra note
66, §177.
70 Annots., 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928), 76 A.L.R. 681 (1932), 98 A.L.R. 402 (1935), 18
A.L.R.2d 220 (1951).
71 Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955); Wells v.
Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 1 F.2d 453 (La. App. 1942); Thompson v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. Hartford, 177 S.C. 120, 180 S.E. 880 (1935). And see
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1957) where the court
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is sought is unrelated to such injuries, but instead may be "traceable
to the peril in which defendant's negligence placed the plaintiff."7 2 This
concept further has been enlarged to include the injury designated as
"shock. ' 73 It may be true that a physical touching, apparently required
by a substantial minority of jurisdictions, 74 furnishes a practical test of
compensability. In practice, the enlargement of what may satisfy a
contact, has resulted in some instances in achieving a similar result on
like facts, under supposedly contrary rules of law. Current holdings
defy classification under majority and minority rules. They would be
reflected more accurately by saying that recovery may be had for mental
harm resulting from either injury or impact upon the person enduring
the harm, and that where no substantial physical contact occurs in fact,
proof of objective, bodily harm is required.75 This is a corallary of the
general rule that mental suffering will not support a cause of action.7 6
This latter rule, in return, is modified to some degree by the interpreta-
tion of the nature of physical and mental harm in a given jurisdiction. 77
suggests: "Were we to follow the minority in requiring some sort of token
impact, the impact on the wall on the other side of which Colla was sleeping
might well be considered enough."
72 Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955).
73 In Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 195 F.2d 241, at 243 (10th Cir.1952) the court quotes with approval the following definition of shock given
by plaintiff's attending physician who stated that the term shock could denote
either 1) a cerebral anemia, or 2) the result of the injury and its effect on
the brain. In this case the shock resulted when defendant's train crossed a
bridge on which the severely injured person was lying. Note also the con-
concurring and in part dissenting opinion of Mussmano, J., in Potere v. City
of Philadelphia, supra note 73, at 104: "However, I wish to state that it
can happen that a person would suffer a severe traumatic emotional shock
without physical injury or physical impact." See also Smith and Solomon,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 122; where shock is defined as a "transient physiologi-
cal response" as distinguished from a traumatic neurosis which is a "psycho-
logical response."
74 American General Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 268 S.W.2d 528 (Court of Civil Appeals,
Texas 1954). In compensation cases the larger industrial states still require
a physical impact in the interpretation of what constitutes compensable in-
injury under the applicable statutes. In the Bailey Case, a workman who sus-
tained bruises in an accident in which he saw a co-worker fall to his death,
was denied compensation for a subsequent traumatic neurosis. This view has
been criticized. See Pound, Comments on Recent Important Workmen's
Compensation Cases, 14 NACCA L. J. 47 (1954).
75 Cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §436(2) (1934): "If the actor's conduct is negligent
as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another, otherwise
than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emo-
tional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal op-
eration of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor
from liability."
Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Pankopf v.
Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909), 24 L.R.A., N.S. 1159; Kaufman v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), noted in 34 TEXAS
L. REv. 487 (1956). The latter case involved the negligent transmission of a
telegraph message. In these cases there can be no physical touching.
76 Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) ; Holland v. Good Bros., 318
Mass. 300, 61 N.E.2d 544 (1945) ; Doherty v. Mississippi Power Co., 187 Miss.204, 173 So. 287 (1937) ; Kaufman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 224 F.2d
723 (5th Cir. 1955). See also note 95 infra.
77 See note 90 infra for discussion of the context of objective injury.
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3. Summary:
Two recent developments in tort law have resulted in a greater pro-
tection of the interest in freedom from mental harm. The recognition
of a separate, "new," intentional tort permits compensation for severe
emotional distress evidenced by physical harm when caused by aggra-
vated, reprehensible language and conduct. In negligence law, the abol-
ishing of a requirement of direct physical impact as a condition to lia-
bility for causing mental harm with resultant physical injury by a
majority of the courts has substantially increased the possibility of re-
covery of damages for injury to the mind. As a result of these changes
imposing wider liability, the emphasis in the controversy as to the
compensation of mental harm has shifted from the area of liability to
that of damages.
B. Rationale of Compensability of Mental Harm:
Recent trends in judicial attitudes, if pursued to their logical ex-
tremes, may lead to the imposition of liability "to infinity '78 for tortious
conduct resulting in mental harm. In effect, there would be imposed on
every actor the duty not to expose another to the risk of being emo-
tionally distressed. While recovery for harm sustained may be desir-
able in the interest of justice to injured persons, it becomes increasingly
important to consider what limitations may be placed, in justice and
reason, on such potential liability. It is therefore pertinent to consider
what limitations may be placed, in justice and reason, on such potential
liability. It is therefore pertinent to consider possible limitations on
recovery incident to recent principles and to re-examine earlier reasons
for denying compensation as to their validity and applicability to pres-
ent holdings.
Denial of recovery may result from failure to establish a cause of
action or from failure to prove the value of the claim. It may also be
due to the judicial policy of a given jurisdiction. In negligence cases,
unless plaintiff proves that a duty is owed to him by the defendant,
liability can not ensue. In jurisdictions following the reasoning of the
Palsgraf majority,7 9 the plaintiff must be a person within the risk be-
fore a duty toward him can arise. It has been held that, unless the
plaintiff be within the zone of danger to his person (not danger to an-
other or to his property), he is not a person within the risk.8 0
There is conflict on the question whether a person with an unusual
susceptibility to injury may be a person within the risk. One view holds
that in the absence of defendant's knowledge of this peculiarity, no duty
78 PROSSER, op. cit. supra, note 52, §48, at 262.
7 9Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).80 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), Annot., 28 A.L.R.
1070 (1924); Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d397 (1955); Venske v. Johnson-Lieber Co., 47 Wash.2d 511, 288 P.2d 249
(1955). Contra: Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933);
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951).
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is owed."' Such an idiosyncratic response is a characteristic of the
neuroses. The neurotic will sustain harm where a normal individual
would not be thus affected under the circumstances. However, there
is substantial authority supporting a contrary view, 2 and in many cases
involving a traumatic neurosis the question appears not to have been
raised.
A duty can arise only where the interest invaded is one that enjoys
legal recognition. When mental harm is brought about by intentional
conduct, or when it results from physical impact upon the person and is
relatively proportionate to the physical injury, the injury to body and
mind is an invasion of a protected interest.8 3 Uusually, the concept of
pain and suffering encompasses mental harm which common experience
has led to be expected from a particular impact.8 4 Medically, pain is
classified as a "psycho-physiological phenomenon,"85 but in layman's
language, and in the sense in which the term has usually been used in
law, pain, in the absence of an unusual response, is the disagreeable sen-
sation, resulting from stimulation of the sensory nerves. In this context,
pain is "literal pain or anguish or discomfort in the physical sense 8 6
and does not arise independently of physical impact.
The term, suffering, generally has been associated with the emo-
tional response to the injury as a whole; in other words, suffering is
81 Braun v. Craven, 175 Il. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898), 41 L.R.A. 199; Oehler v.
L. Bamberger & Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 1003, 135 Atl. 71 (1926), aff'd 103 N.J. 703,
137 At. 425 (1927) ; Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E. 2d
169 (1939).
See also, Stewart Premenstrual Tension in Automobile Accidents, 6
CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. '1957), for a discussion of this unrevealed physical
and mental dysfunction.
82 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §312, comment c (1934) : "Where, however, the dis-
tress is likely to be physically harmful only to a person who has a peculiar
sensitivity to emotional strain which is not characteristic of any substantial
minority of women or men, the actor is not liable under the rule stated in this
section unless he knows or from facts known to him, should realize that the
other has or may have such a peculiarity."
Cf. the rule in intentional tort, RESTATEMENT, TORTS §27, comment a
(1934) : "It is immaterial that, due to the abnormally sensitive reactions of
the other, he is put in apprehension by acts which would not have caused such
an apprehension on the part of normally constituted persons."
Advanced age and poor physical condition at the time of the accident
which contributed to claimant's sustaining a greater injury did not reduce the
amount of compensation which was predicated on the actual results of the
injury on wage earning capacity in Milwaukee Western Fuel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 245 Wis. 334, 13 N.W.2d 919 (1944). In Peitz v. Industrial Ac-
cident Board, 127 Mont. 316, 264 P.2d 709 (1953) it is held that the employer
takes the employee subject to his physical condition at the time he enters
employment.
83 See also Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 108, 125 (1951). PROSSER, op cit. supra note 47,
§37. OLECK, op. cit. supra note 66, §170.
84 OLECK, op. cit. supra note 66, at ch. 15; Dodson v. Cobb, 92 Ga.App. 654,
89 S.E.2d 552 (1955), (there is a presumption of law that bodily pain and
suffering results from personal injury).
85 CANTOR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 434. See also Flaxman, Pain, 3 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 51 (1957).
86 Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943).
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the impact on the mind occurring simultaneously with either physical or
mental injury. In this sense suffering includes "fright, nervousness,
grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, and indignity,
as well as physical pain."'8 7
Thus it may be seen that pain and suffering may encompass not
only normal responses but also symptoms of the neuroses. However,
,unless the neurotic components are specially alleged as part of the
damages, no particular proof is required for the compensation of pain
and suffering8 8
In jurisdictions permitting recovery where no direct physical im-
pact occurred in fact, the courts look to the "nature of the results,"8 9
that is to say, to the evidence of the harm sustained to determine
whether there has been an invasion of bodily security sufficiently se-
vere to warrant recognition, and to permit a finding that a duty is owed.
"Physical injury" is almost universally required and recognized as
proof of the reality and severity of the mental harm. 90 Physical injury
may follow as a consequence of the mental distress, as for example
heart failure,91 skull fracture, 92 or the so-called psychic miscarriage.
93
Physical disability may also be the objective aspect of the emotional
state, as for example hysterical paralysis, anesthesia, or emaciation re-
sulting from neurotic gastro-intestinal disturbances.94 Injuries of the
latter type have no demonstrable origin in organic pathology and
differ from those organically caused. A paralysis due to injury of the
nervous tissue will almost invariably be of a permanent duration. Hys-
terical paralysis may disappear spontaneously, or on successful treat-
ment of the emotional conflict, provided no serious damage has resulted
from the disuse of the muscles involved. A distinction between physical
and mental injury based strictly on the objective nature of the symptoms
ignores these differences which may have legal consequences. It may
also result in a denial of recovery where a traumatic neurosis involves
a behavioral reaction characterized by phobias, anxiety, or dissociation,
even though these subjective aspects of the neurosis cause severe
87 Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 130 P.2d 389, 390 (1942). Cf. RESTATEMENT,
TORTS §46, comment f (1948 supp.), definition of emotional distress, note 33
supra.
88 Butts v. Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6 (1938), Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1441
(1938).
89 Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 195 F.2d 241, at 243 (10th Cir. 1952).
90 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §436 (1934).
91 Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
92 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931); Hall v. Doremus,
12 N.Y. Misc. 319, 171 Atl. 781 (1934) (claimant fainted at "unsightly scene
of calf being born hind quarters first").
93 Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909). But see Note, Tort
Liability for Miscarriage "Caused" by Fright, 15 CmI. L. REv. 188 (1947),
questioning the causal relationship between emotional states and premature
termination of pregnancy in the absence of direct violence.
94 See notes 16, 17, 51 supra.
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anguish and incapacity. A few recent decisions take a broader view
of what constitutes physical injury. In effect, these holdings tend to
obliterate the medically artificial distinction between physical and
mental, and also qualify the rule that mental suffering will not support
a cause of action. 95 Under this latter view, the action may be main-
tained and the evaluation of the "nature of the results" bears on the
valuation of the claim rather than on the issue of liability.
Assuming that liability is established by a finding of duty and delict,
the further requirement of causation must be met. In traumatic neuro-
sis, the defendant's conduct may be responsible for the onset of overt
symptoms of an already existing impairment. Medicine attributes the
cause of this impairment to emotional conflicts antedating the trauma
brought about by the tortious conduct and considers the trauma merely
a precipitating factor of but a part of the course of the disorder. Never-
theless, legal causation in fact requires only that the harm would not
have been sustained but for the defendant's act, and under this prin-
ciple the tortious conduct may be considered as a substantial factor in
bringing about the plaintiff's harm. G In respect to the element of cau-
sation, the defendant is usually held responsible for all unforeseeable
consequences of his negligent act, including those resulting because of
a concealed physical condition such as pregnancy and latent diseases
such as heart disease and the neuroses.97
95 "It cannot be overemphasized that the human body can through negligence
of others suffer injury in only two ways: (1) by physical impact, and (2)
by shock, through the senses to the nervous system. A person can suffer
both at the same time or he can experience one alone. In either event,
actionable mental suffering may result." Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 250
Cal.App.2d 220, 249 P.2d 843 (1952). ". . . [D]efinite nervous disturbance
or disorder caused by mental shock and excitement are classified as physical
injuries and will suport an action for damages." Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz.
355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954).
No physical injury required in Klumbach v. Silver Mount Cemetery Ass'n,
248 App. Div. 843, 275 N.Y. Supp. 180 (1934) (negligent mishandling of
corpse), and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743(1935), Annot., 72 A.L.R. 1192 (1931) (negligent transmission of telegraph
message).
96 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 21(1955) ; Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345, 347 (1957) where
the court sets out the events in the chain of causation: ". . . [T]he truck
rolled down the hill and crashed into Colla's house near the place where he
was sleeping, the crash made a loud noise, the noise frightened Colla, the scare
caused his heart to falter and fail and thus caused his pain, suffering and
death and the other damages. Thus, the negligence was a substantial factor
in producing the injuries, and therefore a proximate cause of them, even
though Mandella neither foresaw, nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred."
See also Auerbach, Causation: A Medico-legal Battlefield, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 209 (1957) ; Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-legal Con-flicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 630 (1953).
97 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §461 (1934): "The negligent actor may be liable for
harm to another although a physical condition of the other which is neither
known nor should be known to the actor makes the injury greater than that
which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen as a probable result
of his conduct." Jonte v. Key System, 39 Cal.App.2d 654, 201 P.2d 562 (1949).
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The "substantial factor" doctrine has also obviated arguments favor-
ing failure of causation because mental harm such as traumatic neuro-
sis may be too remote or too extraordinary a consequence of the
tortious conduct unless it is so in fact as to time and space. Further-
more, such objections are not consistent with medical knowledge of
mental harm and mental disorders.
One other consideration with reference to traumatic neurosis is
pertinent in the area of causation. When dealing with a neurotic re-
sponse to an injury, especially when secondary gain factors are com-
ponents of the dynamic source of the neuroses, as for example in
compensation neuroses, there should be careful analysis of possible in-
dependent, intervening factors. Tortious conduct need not necessarily
be considered a substantial factor in bringing about an incapacity which
would not have occurred but for the unconscious desire for compensa-
tion.98
The scope and ultimate definition of duty and causation, in the last
analysis, are expressions of judicial policy. Holding that any given
harm is not proximately caused, or that a person, or a harm is not
within the risk may prove logically to be an untenable legal or medical
position. Such a view has been criticized as "begging the question" 99 by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court which takes the position that "The deter-
mination to deny liability is essentially one of public policy rather than
of duty and causation."'100 Recovery may also be denied on the ground
of public policy notwithstanding a finding of causation in favor of the
plaintiff because in the opinion of the court the injury may be:
"... 'wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negli-
gent tortfeasor,' or in retrospect it appears too highly extraord-
inary that the negligence should have brought about the harm, or
because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a
burden upon users of the highway, or be too likely to open the
way to fradulent claims, or would enter a field that has no sensi-
ble or just stopping point."''
When a cause of action is established, the burden remains on the
plaintiff to prove the value of his claim. When traumatic neurosis fol-
lows as a consequence of physical injury, it has frequently, particularly
in older cases, been merged in the damages as a component of pain and
Compare the effect of a hidden peculiarity of the plaintiff with respect to
the element of duty, note 82 supra. And see Smith and Solomon, supra note
29, at 91: "Compensation of neurosis following trauma as a new and original
injury is... legally erroneous and socially unjust."
98 See Compensation neurosis, note 37 supra. Compensation neurosis not held
compensable in Schneyder v. Cadillac Motor Co., 280 Mich. 127, 273 N.W. 418
(1937) ; Drexel v. Jurgenson, 19 N.J. Misc. 643, 22 A.2d 816 (1941). Contra:
Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 62 Idaho 192, 109 P.2d 622 (1941).
99 Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1957).
100 Id. at 348.
101 Ibid.
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suffering, while its objective manifestations were treated as part of the
physical injury. In these instances no attempt has been made to es-
tablish a recognizable mental disorder. Instead, characteristic symptoms
such as hysterial paralysis, anxiety state, nervousness or sleeplessness
have been alleged has part of the harm sustained.10 2 Of course, that is
not to say that every allegation of nervousness or anxiety necessarily
indicated the existence of a neurosis. Where, however, traumatic
neurosis is claimed as a compensable element of the personal injury,
particularly where the mental harm is markedly disproportionate to
the physical harm, or the response is one that could not reasonably
be anticipated as a.result of the total occurrence constituting the tortious
conduct, the better view requires competent expert testimony as to the
intensity, degree, duration and resultant incapacity of any harm of a
subjective nature.103 In proper cases, psychiatry is prepared today to
give substantiating evidence of mental harm and mental disorders, based
on accepted methods of diagnosis and observation.1 0 4
The reported cases, involving instances of traumatic neurosis, show
wide variations in the amounts of damages and compensation awards
in the various jurisdictions.10 5
In personal injury actions, a tortfeasor must, as a general rule,
compensate for all consequences of his act and cannot invoke a previ-
ous condition to reduce the amount of damages. 10 6 There is authority,
however, that damages be apportioned where several causes, faulty or
innocent, contribute to bring about the harm.10 7 It has been suggested
102 See notes 44, 17 supra.
103 Landrath v. Allstate Insurance Co., 259 Wis. 248, 48 N.W.2d 485 (1951).
104 NoYEs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 452.
105 Compensation award of $88,666 where claimant was struck by baggage car.
Disability consisted of pain in neck, lower back, headaches, muscular spasms,
boot-like anesthesia. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Kifer, 216
F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1954). Damages in the amount of $12,259.18 awarded to
badly bruised plaintiff who suffered from an anxiety state with considerable
emotional difficulty for many weeks. Sexton v. Key System Transit Lines,
144 Cal.App.2d 719, 301 P.2d 612 (1956). Damages of $125,000 awarded to
plaintiff who was severely injured. At time of trial there was evidence of
backache, difficulty in walking, severe headaches, impotency and psycho-
neurosis "which will increase as time goes on and may result in a break-
down." (Cf. Smith and Solomon, supra note 29, at 127: "Traumatic neurosis
cannot be regarded as a permanent disability.") $100,000 of the verdict was
allocated to compensate for the injuries, for the pain and suffering and for
loss of earning power. The latter was computed at $79,200. Sullivan v. City
& County of San Francisco, 95 Cal.App.2d 745, 214 P.2d 82, 91 (1950). $7,000
was considered excessive for traumatic neurosis with minor physical injuries.
This was reduced to $4,500 in Landrath v. Allstate Insurance Co., 259 Wis.
248, 48 N.W.2d 485 (1951). Severely injured plaintiff who suffered great pain
and was highly nervous, melancholy and discouraged nine months after the
accident had been awarded $5,000 for pain and suffering. The court held in
finding this amount excessive that, "... a jury, properly actuated and upon
due consideration would be likely to assess the damages for pain and suffer-
ing in the instant case, at not less than $1,500 or more that $3,000. Butts v.
Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 405, 279 N.W. 6 (1938).
10G PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 71, §48. 15 Am. JUR., Damages §80, 81 (0000).
10" Moore v. Tremelling, 100 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Gates v. Fleischer, 87 Wis.
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that this rule, by analogy, be applied to instances of mental harm such
as traumatic neurosis which involve a pre-traumatic impairment108 In
workmen's compensation actions, particularly where the pre-existing
condition was shown to be more than a latent tendency, a few jurisdic-
tions approve apportioning awards in cases of traumatic neurosis be-
tween damages due to the accident and those attributable to the prior
neurotic condition, thereby limiting compensation to the extent of the
aggravation of the impairment. 0 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Compensation for mental disturbance such as traumatic neurosis
is being demanded and granted with increasing frequency. This may
be due to a number of causes, such as the relatively high incidence of
the neuroses in th general population; the numerous anxiety producing
factors inherent in the daily life of our complex, charged-with-tension
society; the identification by medicine of the distinct entity of these
mental disorders, their etiology, symptomatology, prognosis and ther-
apy; and changing judicial attitudes toward the compensability of
mental harm in general.
Notwithstanding the general rule that the interest in peace of mind
is not protected against invasion by negligent conduct, recent cases in-
volving the compensation of harm following psychic impact indicate a
trend which may lead to the independent recognition of this interest in
negligence, as it has been recognized in intentional tort. In effect, this
accords protection to the personality as a whole and reflects philosophi-
cal as well as scientific concepts of the nature of man.
In view of the transitional state of the law, legal concepts as to the
nature of trauma, pain and suffering, physical injury and mental in-
jury require clarification to avoid ambiguity and inconsistency with
scientific fact. The mental states have both objective and subjective
aspects is particularly significant in instances of traumatic neurosis.
Either aspect may result in severe anguish, impairment and incapacity.
Whenever an alleged mental or physical disturbance seems to be
unusual, out of proportion to the impact of the tortious conduct, or
unrelated to the expected physical injury, the presence of traumatic
neurosis should be suspected and every effort be made to confirm or
504, 30 N.W. 674 (1886) ; O'Keefe v. Kansas City Western Ry. Co.. .... Kan.
164 Pac. 416 (1912). Cf. Denman v. Johnston, 85 Mich. 387, 48 N.W.
565 (1891) ; Forntner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
108 Smith and Solomon, supra note 29, at 133, 134.
'
09 In Ashland Limestone Co. v. Wright, 294 S.W. 149, 219 Ky. 691 (1927), the
Board in effect "separated the results of pre-existing disease from those of
the accidental injury, as the evidence discloses that the appellee is totally
disabled, and the board found that 50% of his disability is due to the acci-
dent. The disability due to traumatic neurotic condition amounted to 50%.
Accord: Smith v. Essex County Park Commission, 15 N.J. Misc. 227, 190
AtI. 45 (1937); Moray v. Industrial Commission, 58 UtahA404, 199 Pac. 1023(1921) ; Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239, 22 P.2d 157 (1933).
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rule out such a diagnosis by submitting the problem to a qualified psy-
chiatrist. 1 0 To the plantiff the importance of such a diagnosis lies in
establishing the presence of a "recognizable mental disorder," known to
afflict a "substantial minority"' of people, thereby ruling out esoteric
responses and malingering. The defendant may further his cause by
demonstrating the unusual susceptibility to harm, the aggravation of
an existing impairment, and the many factors, of which trauma is only
one, operative in the production of a neurosis.
When confronted with traumatic neurosis as an element of the
harm sustained, the lawyer is faced with special problems. He must
sufficiently understand the technical concepts and language involved.
He must be able to translate these terms into language meaningful to
the trier of facts and yet preserve their accuracy. He must further be
prepared to face honest differences of opinion among the experts. In
the interpretation of predominantely subjective phenomena, each spe-
cialist is conditioned by the views of the school in which he was trained,
as well as by his personal attitudes and experience. It will be found,
however, that there is general agreement as to the psychogenic origin of
the neuroses, and as to the involuntariness of their symptoms, difficult
as an acceptance of such concepts may be for the lay public. The ques-
tion of malingering may be particularly troublesome. Here, too, the ex-
perts may differ in good faith due to influences in their background and
experience.
One objection to the legal recognition of subjective, intangible harm
raised today, is the possibility of "vexatious and fictitious 11 2 claims.
This objection may be met to some degree by a requirement of compe-
tent proof of the alleged harm. Here it is hoped that further progress
in medicine and particularly in psychology and psychiatry will furnish
a greater degree of certainty by demonstrating tangible physiological
and anatomical changes incident to the psychological processes involved
in emotional states. As competent proof is forthcoming to support
claims of mental harm resulting from impact tortiously caused, there
is correspondingly less justification to deny compensation for the disa-
bility of mental harm while allowing it for physical injury occurring
under similar circumstances.
110 See Loria, Traumatic Neurosis, 35 MIcH. S.B.J. 38 (1956) for an informa-
tive article to aid lawyers in evaluating a neurotic individual. The author
lists the following check points: inapropriate response, personality changes,
bizzarre symptomatology, metastasis of symptoms, shopping for lawyer,
shopping for doctor, accident proneness, garrulousness, proving something
other than financial interest, circumstances of particular stress situation,
symbolic injury, disease frequently associated with emotional factors, armed
forces status, history of institutionalization, stability in family relationships,
migratory worker, criminal record, relationship with spouse, prolific writer,
and actual medical report.
11 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §905, comment i, supra note 25, and 312, comment c,
supra note 82.
112 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 54, §37, at 177.
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Possible limitations on liability and on the amount of damages re-
coverable for mental harm such as traumatic neurosis deserve consider-
ation. In intentional tort, liability for invasion of mental tranquillity is
conditioned on the character of the defendant's conduct. In negligence,
the primary condition imposed on recovery is an objective manifesta-
tion of the state of mind or a consequential physical injury. Predicat-
ing liability on the objective nature of the harm sustained may lead to
what an older view rejected as creating a cause of action in favor of
the specially predisposed claimant while denying it to the normally
constituted, equally situated person.113 This result may be avoided to
some degree by giving greater weight in the initial determination of
liability to the total occurrence constituting the tort, that is, to the cir-
cumstances occasioning the mental harm, such as the imminence of
personal danger creating the psychic trauma for which compensation
is sought. Weight to be accorded to the various factors spelling liability
is within the realm of judicial policy in determining standards of con-
duct.1 4 Policy may further consider the economic and social conse-
quences of the burden of potential liability on every actor resulting
from an extension of compensability of mental harm in personal in-
juries. 115
113 Braun v. Craven, 175 II. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
3.4 "The fundamental idea of liability for wrongful acts is that upon a balancing
of the social interests involved in each case, the law determines that under
the circumstances of a particular case an actor should or should not be-
come liable for the natural consequences of his conduct." Osborne v. Mont-
gomery, 203 Wis. 233, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
115 "Tort liabilities are charges on the economy." Morris, Law and the Future,
Torts, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 273, 276 (1956).
